

(c) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall include the following elements:

(1) A clear plan, developed in close consultation with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces of Ukraine, for how the IMET program will be used by the United States Government and the Government of Ukraine to propel program graduates to positions of prominence in support of the Ukrainian military's reform efforts in line with NATO standards.

(2) An assessment of the education and training requirements of the Ukrainian military and clear recommendations for how IMET graduates should be assigned by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense upon completion of education or training.

(3) An accounting of the current combat requirements of the Ukrainian military and an assessment of the viability of alternative mobile training teams, distributed learning, and other flexible solutions to reach such students.

(4) An identification of opportunities to influence the next generation of leaders through attendance at United States staff and war colleges, junior leader development programs, and technical schools.

(d) FORM.—The strategy required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

#### SEC. 1299D. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON LOAN PROGRAM.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) as appropriate, the United States Government should provide direct loans to Ukraine for the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services pursuant to the authority of section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2763) to support the further development of Ukraine's military forces; and

(2) such loans should be considered an additive security assistance tool, and not a substitute for Foreign Military Financing for grant assistance or Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative programming.

#### SEC. 1299E. STRATEGY TO PROTECT UKRAINE'S DEFENSE INDUSTRY FROM STRATEGIC COMPETITORS.

(a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the United States should work with the Government of Ukraine to ensure strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector are not subject to foreign ownership, control, or undue influence by strategic competitors to the United States, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC). These efforts will require support from across the Executive Branch and should leverage all available tools and authorities.

(b) STRATEGY REQUIRED.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and in consultation with the heads of other relevant Departments and agencies as the President may determine, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a strategy to support Ukraine in protecting its aerospace and defense industry from predatory investments.

(2) ELEMENTS.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall include the following elements:

(A) An assessment of the efforts by strategic competitors, such as the PRC, to acquire strategic assets and companies in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector and the national security implications for Ukraine, the United States, and other NATO allies and partners.

(B) An assessment of the vulnerabilities that strategic competitors of the United

States exploit to acquire strategic assets in the Ukrainian aerospace and defense sector, Ukraine's progress in addressing them, and United States initiatives to support these efforts such as assistance in strengthening Ukraine's investment screening and national security vetting laws.

(C) An assessment of Ukraine's efforts to make reforms necessary to incentivize Western investment in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector and United States support for these efforts.

(D) A strategy to—

(i) promote, as appropriate, United States direct investment in Ukraine's aerospace and defense sector;

(ii) better leverage tools like debt financing, equity investments, and political risk insurance to incentivize greater participation by United States firms;

(iii) provide an alternative to PRC investments; and

(iv) engage like-minded allies and partners on these efforts.

(3) FORM.—The strategy required under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.

(c) APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

#### SEC. 1299F. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—There is authorized to be appropriated to the Department of State \$50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2022 through 2026 for the purposes described in subsection (b) with respect to Ukraine.

(b) USE OF FUNDS.—Amounts appropriated pursuant to subsection (a) may only be used—

(1) to strengthen Ukraine's cyber security, cyber resilience and intellectual property enforcement;

(2) to provide support and training in Ukraine for—

(A) sectoral reforms related to banking and public finance management reform;

(B) the privatization of state-owned enterprises;

(C) regulatory independence;

(D) subsidy reform;

(E) land reform;

(F) corporate governance; and

(G) foreign investment screening;

(3) to combat corruption, improve the rule of law, and otherwise strengthen independent legal institutions, including by—

(A) expanding regional anti-corruption training and exchanges among Ukrainian Ministry officials, law enforcement officers, judges, and prosecutors to build peer support, share best practices, maintain reform momentum, and protect reforms from capture;

(B) supporting regional training of United States Embassy personnel responsible for supporting anti-corruption and the rule of law to improve their effectiveness in supporting the consolidation and expansion of reform;

(4) to respond to the humanitarian crises caused or aggravated by the invasion and occupation of Ukraine by the Russian Federation, including by supporting internally displaced persons and communities in conflict-affected areas;

(5) to improve participatory legislative processes in Ukraine, including through—

(A) engagement with members of the Verkhovna Rada;

(B) training on government oversight, legal education, political transparency and competition, and compliance with international obligations; and

(C) supporting the development of professional legislative staff to advise and assist member of the Verkhovna Rada and committees in the execution of their duties and build legal and policy expertise within the Verkhovna Rada; and

(6) to further build the capacity of civil society, independent media, human rights, and other nongovernmental organizations in Ukraine, with an emphasis on—

(A) building capacity outside of Kyiv; and

(B) regional civil society training and exchange programs.

#### SEC. 1299G. DETERMINATION OF WHETHER NORD STREAM 2 AG AND ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTION VESSELS MEET CRITERIA FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS UNDER PROTECTING EUROPE'S ENERGY SECURITY ACT OF 2019.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 15 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report that includes the following:

(1) The determination of the President with respect to whether Nord Stream 2 AG meets the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019.

(2) The determination of the President with respect to whether the following vessels and entities meet the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019:

(A) Akademik Cherskiy.

(B) Umka.

(C) Errie.

(D) Yuri Topchev.

(E) Mentor.

(F) DP Gezina.

(G) Krebs GEO.

(H) Vladislav Strizhov.

(I) Glomar Wave.

(J) Finval.

(K) Katun.

(L) Venie.

(M) Murman.

(N) Baltiyskiy Issledovatel.

(O) Artemis Offshore.

(P) Havila Subsea.

(Q) Russian Maritime Register of Shipping.

(R) LLC Insurance Company Constanta.

(S) TÜV Austria Holding AG.

(3) A detailed explanation for each determination made under paragraph (1) or (2), including with respect to any determination that the criteria for the imposition of sanctions under the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 were not met with respect to a vessel or entity.

(b) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term “Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019” means the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act of 2019 (title LXXV of Public Law 116–92; 22 U.S.C. 9526 note), as amended by section 1242 of the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–283).

#### SEC. 1299H. APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.

In this subtitle, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means—

(1) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

**SA 4640.** Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr.

REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle G of title X, add the following:

**SEC. 1064. REQUIREMENT FOR THINK TANKS TO DISCLOSE FOREIGN FUNDING.**

(a) REGULATIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall develop and promulgate regulations requiring covered think tanks and research organizations to submit an annual disclosure to the Under Secretary of State for Management detailing the sources of funding specified in paragraph (3).

(2) COVERED THINK TANKS AND RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS.—For purposes of this section, the term “covered think tanks and research organizations” means United States think tanks and research organizations that—

(A) receive or plan to apply for funding from the Department of State;

(B) participate or intend to participate in more than three Department-hosted events in a calendar year; or

(C) meet, correspond, or otherwise engage with Department of State personnel more than three times in a calendar year.

(3) COVERED SOURCES OF FUNDING.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—The sources of funding referred to in paragraph (1) are—

(i) governments, political parties, state-owned research or academic institutions, and state-owned enterprises from the countries specified in subparagraph (B);

(ii) Persons from the countries specified in such subparagraph; and

(iii) United States and foreign persons, government, institutions, and companies advocating on behalf of the interests of the countries specified in such subparagraph with regard to energy, infrastructure, telecommunications, information technology, defense, or foreign policy.

(B) SPECIFIED COUNTRIES.—The countries referred to in subparagraph (A) are—

(i) the Russian Federation;

(ii) the People's Republic of China; and

(iii) any other country the Secretary of State determines should be subject to the disclosure requirements of this section.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 60 days after the effective date of the regulations promulgated under subsection (a), the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing—

(1) the progress of the Department of State in implementation of the disclosure requirement mandated pursuant to subsection (a);

(2) the officials and offices within the Department responsible for implementing the regulations required under subsection (a);

(3) any challenges or obstacles to implementation; and

(4) any recommendations to improve upon the regulations described required under subsection (a) or overcome challenges to implementation.

(c) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED.—In this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

**SA 4641.** Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to

amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

**SEC. 1253. STATEMENT OF POLICY ON INDO-PACIFIC REGION.**

It shall be the policy of the United States to—

(1) prioritize the Indo-Pacific region in United States foreign policy, and prioritize resources for achieving United States political and military objectives in the region;

(2) exercise freedom of operations in the international waters and airspace in the Indo-Pacific maritime domains, which are critical to the prosperity, stability, and security of the Indo-Pacific region;

(3) maintain forward-deployed forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including a rotational bomber presence, integrated missile defense capabilities, long-range precision fires, undersea warfare capabilities, and diversified and resilient basing and rotational presence, including support for pre-positioning strategies;

(4) strengthen and deepen the alliances and partnerships of the United States to build capacity and capabilities, increase multilateral partnerships, modernize communications architecture, address anti-access and area denial challenges, and increase joint exercises and security cooperation efforts;

(5) reaffirm the commitment and support of the United States for allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region, including longstanding United States policy regarding—

(A) Article V of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed at Washington January 19, 1960;

(B) Article III of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington October 1, 1953;

(C) Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines, signed at Washington August 30, 1951, including that, as the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article IV of our mutual defense treaty;

(D) Article IV of the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, done at San Francisco September 1, 1951; and

(E) the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, done at Manila September 8, 1954, together with the Thanat-Rusk Communiqué of 1962;

(6) collaborate with United States treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific to foster greater multilateral security and defense cooperation with other regional partners;

(7) ensure the continuity of operations by the United States Armed Forces in the Indo-Pacific region, including, as appropriate, in cooperation with partners and allies, in order to reaffirm the principle of freedom of operations in international waters and airspace in accordance with established principles and practices of international law;

(8) sustain the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.) and the “Six Assurances” provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 as the foundations for United States-Taiwan relations,

and to deepen, to the fullest extent possible, the extensive, close, and friendly relations of the United States and Taiwan, including cooperation to support the development of capable, ready, and modern forces necessary for the defense of Taiwan;

(9) enhance security partnerships with India, across Southeast Asia, and with other nations of the Indo-Pacific;

(10) deter acts of aggression or coercion by the People's Republic of China against United States and allies' interests, especially along the First Island Chain and in the Western Pacific, by showing People's Republic of China leaders that the United States can and is willing to deny them the ability to achieve their objectives, including by—

(A) consistently demonstrating the political will of the United States to deepening existing treaty alliances and growing new partnerships as a durable, asymmetric, and unmatched strategic advantage to the People's Republic of China's growing military capabilities and reach;

(B) maintaining a system of forward-deployed bases in the Indo-Pacific region as the most visible sign of United States resolve and commitment to the region, and as platforms to ensure United States operational readiness and advance interoperability with allies and partners;

(C) adopting a more dispersed force posture throughout the region, particularly the Western Pacific, and pursuing maximum access for United States mobile and relocatable launchers for long-range cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific region;

(D) fielding long-range, precision-strike networks to United States and allied forces, including ground-launched cruise missiles, under sea and naval capabilities, and integrated air and missile defense in the First Island Chain and the Second Island Chain, in order to deter and prevent People's Republic of China coercion and aggression, and to maximize the United States ability to operate;

(E) strengthening extended deterrence to ensure that escalation against key United States interests would be costly, risky, and self-defeating; and

(F) collaborating with allies and partners to accelerate their roles in more equitably sharing the burdens of mutual defense, including through the acquisition and fielding of advanced capabilities and training that will better enable them to repel People's Republic of China aggression or coercion; and

(11) maintain the capacity of the United States to impose prohibitive diplomatic, economic, financial, reputational, and military costs on the People's Republic of China for acts of coercion or aggression, including to defend itself and its allies regardless of the point of origin of attacks against them.

**SA 4642.** Mr. RISCH submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following: